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Even babies have an implicit appreciation of the relationship between realistic pictures 
and the objects that they depict, but a mature understanding of pictures involves an 
explicit appreciation of how pictures work. Adults appreciate that pictures are public 
representations that can communicate information to other people, and that some 
pictures are better at doing this than others. We explore the foundations of this 
understanding in young children. In three experiments, using yes/no and forced-choice 
questions, we find that 3- and 4-year olds understand that other people benefit from 
pictures that contain greater perceptual detail and that the more realistic the picture, the 





Do young children know what makes a picture useful to other people? 
In a classic article, Hochberg and Brooks (1962) described how they raised a 
child without any access to visual representations, and then, when he was 19-months-
old, showed him photographs and line-drawings of familiar objects and asked him to 
name them. He did so easily, suggesting that children do not need experience with 
pictures in order to appreciate which objects they correspond to. Since then, several 
studies have found that even younger children have some tacit appreciation of the 
relationship between realistic representations and the objects they depict (DeLoache & 
Burns, 1994; Preissler & Carey, 2004; DeLoache, Pierroutsakos, & Troseth, 1996). 
Other studies find that preschool children can use the inferred intention of the artist to 
name pictures that do not resemble what they depict—they appreciate, for instance, that 
if someone stares intently at a spoon while producing a scribble, that this scribble is 
likely to represent the spoon (e.g., Bloom & Markson, 1998; Preissler & Bloom, 2008). 
There is a critical distinction, however, between being able to recognize and 
name pictures versus actually understanding how pictures work.  Domestic chickens 
will respond to a realistic two-dimensional picture of a chicken as if it were another 
chicken (Ryan, 1982), but surely chickens have no explicit grasp of the representational 
properties of pictures. Even 3-month old human babies are able to perceive similarities 
between pictures and the real world, evidenced by the ability to recognize their mother‘s 
face in a color photograph (Barrera & Maurer, 1981).   However, this is far from 
showing an understanding the symbolic and communicative nature of pictures.  In 
contrast, as experienced viewers and creators of pictures, adults know a lot about 
representations and how they work. We appreciate that pictures are public 
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representations that can communicate information to other people, and that some 
pictures are better at doing this than others.  In addition, adults recognize that one‘s own 
knowledge of what a picture represents might differ from the knowledge of other 
people. An artist who just completed an abstract painting of her lover, for instance, will 
be entirely confident about what her painting represents, but will also realize that, in the 
absence of other information, a stranger looking at it will have no idea. 
 We are interested here in the question of whether young children have any 
appreciation of what makes some pictures more useful than others. There are reasons to 
expect this to be difficult for children. DeLoache and her colleagues have discovered 
that preschool children have problems coping with the ―dual nature‖ of 
representations—the fact that they are both symbolic entities and concrete material 
things.  This makes it difficult for them to use representations in certain ways, such as 
finding the location of a hidden object (e.g., DeLoache & Burns, 1994; DeLoache, 
Miller, and Rosengren, 1997; see also Preissler & Bloom, 2007). Other researchers find 
that preschool children often have problems reasoning about pictures independently of 
the objects that they represent; they sometimes say ―yes‖ when shown a picture and 
asked, ―Can you eat this picture of an apple‖, and they sometimes agree that if you get 
close enough to a picture of a rose, you can smell it (Beilin and Pearlman, 1991; 
Thomas, Nye, and Robinson, 1994).  In addition, children of this age tend to have a 
broad conception of what constitutes a picture, and include letters and numbers as 
acceptable pictures, in addition to drawings (Thomas, Nye, Rowley & Robinson, 2001).  
Finally, there might be special difficulties in children‘s understanding that others might 
not recognize a picture that they themselves recognize, since, in general, children tend 
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toward egocentrism—they are highly vulnerable to the so-called ‗curse of knowledge‘ 
(see Birch & Bloom, 2003).  
Here we address these issues through use of simple yes/no and forced-choice 
questions. In Experiment 1, we explore whether children believe that a detailed picture 
makes a better symbol than a less detailed one, even if both could depict the same 
referent.  Experiment 2 investigates whether a simple preference for detailed pictures by 
young children could be responsible for the results of Experiment 1.   Finally, 





In Experiment 1 we provide children with two plausible depictions of a referent, 
and varied the level of perceptual detail, to examine whether children think that more 





Sixteen children (mean age 4.0 years; range 3.2 – 4.6 years) recruited from the 
Unitots nursery at the University of Edinburgh were included in the study.  There were 
7 males and 9 females.   
Materials  
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 Eight pre-drawn pictures of familiar entities were used in the study.  For each 
trial, two pictures depicted the same referent, however one was detailed and one was 
vague (see Figure 1).  The stimuli included pairs depicting a house,  dog, car, and the 
experimenter. 
-Insert Figure 1 about here- 
Procedure 
Children were seated at a table across from the experimenter.  Each participant 
was presented with 4 pairs of pictures, 2 per trial.  Both members of the pair could 
depict a particular referent (such as a house), however one was a simple, relatively 
vague drawing, and the other a more detailed artist‘s rendering.  Children were 
presented with each member of the pair randomly, and asked for each: ―If we showed 
this to Anna (the nursery coordinator), would she know what it is a picture of?‖  Then 
they were asked ―which picture should we show your Mum so she knows what the X 
looks like?‖   During pilot testing, adult participants selected the more detailed picture 
when asked which picture should be shown to someone else so they know what the X 
looks like.  We interpret this as understanding that the detailed picture is a better source 
of information to show to someone else, which guided our subsequent hypotheses for 
the child participants. 
 
Results & Discussion 
 
When asked if another person would know what the detailed drawing was a 
picture of, 95% indicated ‗yes‘, whereas only 23% agreed that a person would know the 
identity of the less detailed depiction (McNemar‘s test, 2=31.1, p<.01, d.f.=1).  When 
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asked, ―Which picture should we show your Mum so she knows what the X looks 
like?‖, children selected the more detailed depiction 78% overall—binomial p (two-
tailed) < .0001).  Taken together, these results suggest that children understand that 
other people benefit from detailed information when linking a picture to its referent.    
However, an alternative explanation is that children simply prefer more detailed 
pictures to simpler depictions, and are answering in accord with their own preferences 
instead of considering the actual information depicted in the pictures.  Experiment 2 
explores this possibility. 
 
Experiment 2 
 In Experiment 2, we present a different sample of children with pictures varying 
both in detail and content (2 different superordinate levels within a given kind 
category).  This experiment will examine if children have a default preference for 
detailed drawings when asked to choose between the two types of pictures. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty native English-speaking children (mean age 4.2 years; range 3.0 to 4.9 
years) recruited from the Unitots nursery at the University of Edinburgh and the Human 
Development Centre at Lancaster University were included in the study.  Twelve males 
and 8 females participated. 
Materials  
The stimuli consisted of eight drawings (2 per trial).   The drawings were simple 
figures, with one of each pair depicting a detailed, non-prototypical example of a 
category such as ‗house‘ (e.g. Japanese style house) and the other showing a less 
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detailed, but prototypical exemplar (a standard western style house).   The stimuli set 
also included pairs of pictures representing a cat (lioness and tabby cat), bird (penguin 
and cardinal) and fish (stingray and goldfish).  The first member of each pair was a 
detailed rendering and the second member of each pair was less detailed (but 
prototypical of the kind category).   A pre-test was comprised of those 8 drawings and 
16 additional drawings (See Figure 2). 
- Insert Figure 2 about here – 
Procedure 
Participants were seated at a small table across from the experimenter.  In order 
to determine that children believed that both examples of the picture pairs to be used in 
the test trials were indeed members of the same category, a pre-test was administered.  
During this pre-test, children were shown all items from the test trials, presented in pairs 
(one prototypical example and one non-prototypical example of the same category), 
along with 2 additional distracter drawings per trial.  Children were asked to show the 
experimenter, for instance, all the ‗houses‘ from the array.  Filler trials were added so 
that the correct response was sometimes one picture, sometimes 2 pictures, and 
sometimes 3 pictures, hence the children could not discern a pattern of 2 correct 
pictures. Only pairs of pictures which ‗passed‘ this pre-test were then used in the test 
phase, hence children individually received from 1-4 test trials tailored to their pre-test 
responses.  Thus, the only items to be used in the test trials were ones in which both 
members of the pair were considered to be members of the same kind category (56 trials 
overall).   
In the test trials, which followed immediately, children were presented with each 
pair of pictures and were told:   ―My friend Daxi has been living in a faraway land and 
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he doesn’t know what a lot of things here in England/Scotland look like.  Can we help 
him?  Let’s help Daxi learn what things here look like.”  They were then asked, “Which 
picture should we show to Daxi so he knows what a (bird/house/cat/fish) looks like?” 
 
Results & Discussion 
Overall, children selected the less detailed (but more prototypical) picture on 
48/56 (85.7%) of the test trials, a highly significant difference from a chance level of 
50% as measured by an independent t-test (p<.001, t(19)=4.3, d=.83). 
These results show that children do not simply have a bias for selecting more 
detailed pictures instead of less detailed ones.  Rather, children are taking into account 
the kind of information the picture contains, and thus have a fairly sophisticated 
understanding that other people may benefit best from a less detailed picture if it 
contains more relevant information.  Experiment 3 investigates whether this hypothesis 
holds when the picture which is the best source of information conflicts with a child‘s 




Experiment 3 explores whether children understand that even though they 
themselves know what the picture is intended to represent, other viewers might not.    
Children of this age often behave egocentrically, showing a ‗curse of knowledge‘ bias, 
which manifests itself by influencing how they interpret other people‘s behavior and 
expectations (Birch & Bloom, 2003).  Here we examine whether children can override 
such a bias when reasoning about the communicative nature of pictures.  More 
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specifically, do children understand that even though they know what a picture 
represents, other people may not share this knowledge? 
 
Method 
Participants.   
Twenty-five children (mean age 4.1 years; range 3.3 – 4.8 years) recruited from 
the Unitots nursery at the University of Edinburgh and the local Edinburgh community 
were included in the study.  There were 12 males and 13 females.   
Materials.  
 Twelve pre-drawn pictures and four novel objects were used in the study (see 
Figure 3).  The drawings included 4 pictures which represented each of the target novel 
objects in detail, 4 vague pictures ‗drawn‘ by the experimenter to represent each of the 
target novel objects, and 4 detailed distractor pictures which did not resemble any of the 
target objects. 
Procedure 
Children were each shown an opaque bag, and told:  ―My friend Lucy found 
some toys and pictures, and she put them in this bag for us to look at.  They are things 
we have never seen before!‖  There were four trials. In each trial, the experimenter 
selected one object from the bag, reminded the child she has never seen the item before, 
and named it with a novel word (e.g. ―let‘s call this a dax!‖).  The experimenter then 
told the child that she was going to ‗draw a picture of the dax!‘, and she picked up a 
clipboard and oriented a piece of paper on it.  She pretended to draw a picture of the 
object (which was actually pre-drawn).  This picture crudely resembled the object.  
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Children were then asked if they wanted to see the experimenter‘s ‗picture of the dax‘, 
and it was then placed on the table for inspection.   
The experimenter then said to the child, ―Let‘s look at some of the pictures Lucy 
left for me.  Remember we have never seen them before!‖  The experimenter removed 
two pictures from the bag (one detailed drawing which resembled the dax, and one 
distracter drawing), and placed them on the table next to the experimenter‘s drawing of 
the dax. 
Children were then asked: ―My friend John has never seen a dax before!  Which 
picture should we give him so he knows what it looks like?‖ They were also asked to 
indicate, out of the array of 3 pictures, which picture was drawn by the experimenter.  
Finally, children were asked to label the experimenter‘s picture.   
 
Results & Discussion 
 
When asked for a picture to give to John so that he might know what the object 
looks like, children selected the picture the experimenter drew 19% of the time, the 
picture which clearly resembled the object 79% and the distracter picture 2% 
(McNemar‘s test, 2=51.3, p.001, d.f.=2).  
When asked to indicate the picture that the experimenter drew, they selected the 
correct picture 85%, the picture which resembled the target object 15%, and never 
indicated the distracter object. The question of what the experimenter's picture 
represented was more difficult; some children did not answer (37%), and others said 
that they did not know (30%).  When children did respond, however, it was usually by 
naming or pointing to the dax (70% of all responses). 
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We were surprised that so few children were able to identify the experimenter‘s 
picture, given that 2-year-olds succeed on a similar task (Preissler & Bloom, 2008). It 
might be that the referential cues in this current study were not salient enough for 
children to realize what the experimenter was intending to draw.  Another possibility is 
that some children did not remember the label after the brief delay. Alternatively, 
children may have been hindered by the order of the questions. After having picked out 
another picture as the best referent of the object, they perhaps felt that they would be 
contradicting themselves if they said that the experimenter also drew a picture of that 
same object.   
However, there were enough children who correctly stated that the 
experimenter‘s picture is of the dax to ask whether these children were biased by this 
knowledge when choosing a picture for someone else. More specifically, when children 
are themselves aware that a vague picture depicts an object, do they then believe that 
others would benefit from being shown that picture? As predicted, they do not; an 
analysis of just those trials in which the children correctly identified the experimenter‘s 
picture found that these children still tended to choose the detailed picture (81%; 




Pictures are an important source of conveying information, but to serve this 
purpose, they have to be understandable to other people. These three studies suggest 
that 3- and 4-year-olds have some understanding of what makes a picture useful as a 
symbolic tool. Experiment 1 found that children believe that the more realistic a picture, 
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the better, however Experiment 2 showed that children aren‘t simply biased towards 
detailed pictures.  Rather, they pay attention to the content of the picture and use that 
information to decide what picture another person would best benefit from.  Experiment 
3 also found that when children see a relatively crude picture of an object being drawn 
(which they believe represents the object), they appreciate that a different more realistic 
picture is more useful to another person.   
How do children come to know this about pictures? One proposal is that it might 
be an inference based on the child‘s own experience. It might be, for instance, that 
children notice that they themselves would find some of these drawings harder to 
recognize than others and infer that this would hold true for other people.  
This leads to a proposal about younger children and their own drawings.  One 
and 2-year-old children will create scribbles and name them—for instance, they might 
call a certain scribble ―Mommy‖ or ―airplane‖ (Bloom, 2000; Cox, 1992). Perhaps even 
these very early acts of naming are rooted in a sophisticated understanding of other 
people‘s grasp of pictures. In particular, children might be eager to name their pictures 
because they know that these pictures do not resemble their referents, and hence, 
without the name, other people would not be able to tell what they are.  
In sum, we have explored here the developing understanding that pictures are 
public representations that can communicate information to other people, and that some 
pictures are better at doing this than others. There is a lot more to knowing how pictures 
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Figure 1.  Example of stimuli for Experiment 1.  
Figure 2.  Stimuli for Experiment 2. 
Figure 3.  Example of stimuli for Experiment 3. 
 
 
